(1975) 101 ITR 234 (SC)
Interpretations for the charitable organisations chapter
'Education' means systematic instruction, schooling or training — the process of training and developing knowledge and skill by normal schooling. It does not extend to every activity that spreads knowledge.
What does 'education' mean for the purposes of the definition of charitable purpose?
The trust was established with objects that included educating the people of India generally, and in particular the people of Karnataka, by establishing and running newspapers and journals. Its principal activity was the publication of newspapers, from which it derived income. It claimed exemption on the footing that the dissemination of news and views constituted education, and alternatively that its object was one of general public utility not involving an activity for profit.
The claim was rejected by the Revenue and through the appellate stages, and the High Court answered against the trust. The matter came to the Supreme Court, where the meaning of 'education' in the statutory definition fell for detailed consideration.
For the assessee
Newspapers inform and instruct the public and thereby educate them. The word 'education' in the definition is not confined to formal schooling and should be given the wide meaning it bears in ordinary speech, encompassing the spread of knowledge and the shaping of public opinion.
For the Revenue
Education in the statutory sense connotes systematic instruction. If any activity that adds to a person's knowledge were education, the word would have almost no limit and the concession would extend to every publisher, broadcaster and entertainer. The trust's real activity was a newspaper business carried on for profit.
Justice Khanna held that the word 'education' in the definition is used in the sense of systematic instruction, schooling or training given to the young in preparation for the work of life, and by extension to the development of knowledge and skill by normal schooling. It does not comprehend every acquisition of knowledge, however valuable. The Court observed that travelling, reading newspapers and conversing with others all add to a person's knowledge, but that no one would describe those activities as education in the sense the statute intends. Giving the word its wider colloquial meaning would strip the concession of any discernible boundary. The Court also examined the alternative claim under general public utility and considered whether the activity was carried on for profit, noting the absence of any restriction in the trust deed preventing the trustee from conducting the newspaper as a commercial venture. The claim to exemption accordingly failed.
Still the authority on the boundary of 'education' under the IT Act 2025, where the interpretive provisions sit in Section 355. It matters for bodies running seminars, publications, awareness programmes, coaching or online content that assert an educational object, and it should be read with New Noble, which addresses the separate requirement that such an institution exist solely for education.